3: Clarkson H-4 (no date) 1949 R1 Soviet Union R1

150 per cent average increase in production; this had been about two-thirds realized by 1932. The Second Plan had striven for a 200 per cent increase and had been almost three-fourths fulfilled by 1937. The Third Plan had aimed at only 75 per cent increase and its operation had been cut short by war with Germany; achievement by 1940 had been very poor, except in terms of coal and electric power. Despite remarkable advances, per capita production in 1937 was still only a small fraction as compared with that of Western nations.

Nevertheless the success of the device cannot be the subject of doubt. The prewar tempo of industrialization was resumed, at the very time that the outside world was passing through an extremely severe depression. The material standard of living of the masses seems to have followed much the same course in Russia as in the outside world, falling heavily until 1932, then rising again until 1937. Yet all the time the curve of production rose, and rigid adherence to the formula "He who does not work does not eat" banished the dread specter of unemployment. Dissatisfaction with working conditions resulted in a labor turnover on a scale alarming even for Russia, but the need to find employment made it possible to secure labor even in such remote and unattractive areas as Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, while the method of political reëducation of recalcitrant peasants provided a labor force for certain enterprises unable to attract free labor.

The idea of state-run "grain and meat factories" was abandoned. Some State farms were retained as experimental stations, but the collective farms became the chief vehicle of agricultural production. An unforeseen but highly effective means of increasing and controlling production was found in the Machine Tractor Stations. Similarly, in industry, Stakhanovism developed as an improved means of stimulation to greater effort. Both in agriculture and in industry piece-work wages became almost the universal rule. In the revised Constitution (1936) appeared a radically modified version of the time-honored communist slogan: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." In the trade unions were vigorously stamped out the last remnants of the "bourgeois" notion that it is the function of the trade union to advance the interest of the worker as against the employer. Instead, the trade unions, defined as "schools of communism," were charged with the duty of increasing the productivity of labor; at the same time, to maintain their hold over the masses, they were entrusted with administration of all social insurance benefits.

Soviet Constitutions

The tremendous growth of economic activity in Russia found little reflection in the political structure of the country. The rapid industrialization

6: Björk S-4 (no date) 1953 R1 Soviet Union R1

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obligation to work for four years at the place to which they have been directed) and they may not be placed in a lower tariff class (see p. 31) than that given them on passing their examination. They may be directed only to places where suitable accommodation is to be had.

The *Soviet Union's Administrative Law* (published 1950) gives the following details of the regulations for recruiting pupils for the occupational schools: for every hundred male and female members of collective farms between the ages of 14 and 55 the president of an agricultural collective must each year by calling-up order (mobilization) select two persons between the ages of 14 and 17 for artisan and railway schools, and two persons between the ages of 16 and 18 for factory- and workshop-schools. The town soviets are similarly to select young persons for the artisan-, railway-, factory- and workshop-schools, the number being fixed annually by the Council of Ministers (*cf.* p. 172).

According to the Five-Year Plan, four and a half million young qualified workers were to be trained at the schools for 'labour reserves' during the years 1946–1950. According to the statistical report of the Central Administration some 2,900,000 young workers were trained during 1946–1949 and in 1950 494,000, and were placed in industry, building and transport.

Mobility in the Labour Market

● 464 By making use of the legislation that has just been sketched, the central authorities have been able to direct certain categories of workers and employees to different undertakings. At the same time the undertakings have been able to engage labour without the agency of the authorities. Vacant positions have been advertised in the Press, on hoardings, etc. Latterly there have often been complaints over the 'over-mobility' (*tekuchest*) of labour in the Press and other publications. As an example, here is an extract from an article by E. Mochova on labour reserves: 'The facts show that the chief causes of over-mobility among the young workers, which in many cases has not yet been overcome, are to be found in the fact that these young workers' services are not properly made use of and that sufficient attention is not paid to their material living conditions. Workers' over-mobility involves

the state in huge losses, prevents a planned distribution of labour and acts as a brake on increased production. For these reasons the economic leaders, the party, komsomol and trade organizations must devote the maximum of care to the young workers. First and foremost must they be helped to learn how to master the output norms. . . .' 464

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Chapter One

GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKING CLASS

*Distinctive Traits of Russian Labor.—Employment Figures until 1928.—The First Five-Year Plan: Project and Achievement.—Rural Overpopulation and Collectivization of Agriculture.—Collectivization of Agriculture and the Urban Labor Market.—Urbanization Trends.—Working Class Growth, 1932-1941.—The Working Class in the War and Postwar Years.—*APPENDIX: *Statistical Materials on the Working Class.*

Distinctive Traits of Russian Labor

In most continental European countries it was the city people, mainly artisans and other urban groups, whose proletarianization produced the industrial working class. By origin and by tradition, the latter was a predominantly urban social stratum. New-comers from the countryside kept swelling the ranks of industrial labor all over Europe, but in most cases this influx was quickly assimilated by the city. The rural ties of the migrants loosened rapidly. The children of the country-bred new industrial workers retained hardlly a trace of their peasant background.

This is the vital difference between the evolution of labor in Russia and the rest of Europe. In Russia the city as such, and urban handicraft in particular, had never risen to levels comparable to the flowering of urban civilization in Western and Central Europe. Russian industry originated in the country, and until 1861, when serfdom was abolished, much of its labor was done by peasant serfs. Even after it invaded the cities it drew the bulk of the needed manpower from the ranks of the rural populace.

Until quite recently a vast majority of Russian industrial

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545 workers was not only of peasant stock but closely linked with
● 969 the countryside. The continuing bond was not only psychological, resting on family ties as elsewhere in Europe; there also were economic ties, and precisely these were of profound importance. The industrial worker in the city often kept a farm in his native village, and had it run by the women, children, and old men of his family. Very often, too, he would go back to the village himself, tilling his soil for weeks and even months, and then return to the factory after the harvest.

This close connection of urban workers with the farm led many Russian economists and sociologists for a long time simply to deny the existence of a Russian industrial working class.

As late as the 1890's this skepticism was widespread. An outstanding pioneer in the study of labor conditions, E. M. Dement'yev, wrote in 1893: "From olden times the opinion has crystallized in our literature that our factory workers are simply peasants who eke out the scanty income they derive from agriculture by supplementary work in factories; and all statistical and economic investigations for the province of Moscow have hitherto regarded factory work of peasants as a sideline." [1] Dr. Dement'yev opposed this obsolete view on the basis of a survey he had conducted in the 1880's in three counties of Moscow province, on behalf of the Moscow Zemstvo (provincial self-government).

But the ties which bound industrial workers to village and homestead remained close. Dr. Dement'yev himself pointed out that 91.5 per cent of the factory workers covered by his survey were legally members of the peasantry,[2] and that 14.1 per cent of all workers over eighteen years of age would return regularly to do farm work in their native village.[3]

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[1] E. M. Dement'yev, *The Factory. What It Gives the Population and What It Takes Away*, 2d ed., Moscow, 1897, p. 1.

[2] In Tsarist Russia, individual citizens were legally bound to "estates," which implied privileges for the upper classes and restrictions for the lower ones, particularly the peasantry. Until 1917, when the institution was fully abolished, urban workers who came from the country had remained legally peasants for a long time. [649]

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 4 and 18. A recent Russian work on the origin of the Russian industrial working class rightly emphasizes that Dement'yev's figures fail to make the rural connection of industrial labor fully apparent:

"In analyzing these figures, it must be taken into account that the survey was made during a crisis, as a result of which only groups of workers most closely tied

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In other provinces the workers' connection with the rural economy was even closer. Official figures issued for 1893 on the nine factory inspection districts placed the proportion of factory workers periodically returning to the villages for farm work at 28.2 per cent.[4] There were wide fluctuations from industry to industry; according to the same statistics, the seasonal migration quota ranged from 11.1 per cent in the metal trades to 65.4 per cent in the processing of food and beverages.[5]

How much the rural economy meant to industrial workers is not fully expressed by the numbers returning seasonally to work in the fields. It can be seen better from a survey made in a large Moscow textile factory in 1898.[6] Of 2,555 workers employed there, 1,417 (all male) were thoroughly interviewed. 94.2 per cent turned out to be of peasant stock. The following figures reveal their specific rural interests:

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to production remained in the factories." (A. G. Rashin, *The Formation of the Industrial Proletariat in Russia*, Moscow, 1940, p. 405.)

[4] Data of factory inspectors supplied by A. V. Pogozhev, *Establishing the Magnitude and Distribution of Russia's Workers' Population*, published by the Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, 1898, p. 101. The following table indicates the regional distribution, St. Petersburg and the more highly developed Polish districts showing the least "agricultural residues" among industrial workers:

District	*Percent returning to the villages for agricultural labor*
Voronezh	76.8%
Kiev	57.6
Ekaterinoslav	51.8
Vladimir	19.8
Moscow	19.5
Warsaw	17.1
Piotrkow	14.7
Vilna	12.4
St. Petersburg	10.8

Average 9 factory inspection districts 28.2%

[5] Data from Pogozhev, as quoted *supra*, n. 4, p. 100. Percentage oscillations by industries were as follows:

Industry	*Percentage returning*
Metal trades	11.1%
Textiles	18.5
Lumber	30.3
Processing of minerals	35.4
Processing of animal produce	48.1
Food and beverages	65.4

[6] V. Shmakov, *The Workers of the Emil Zindel Factory*, Moscow, 1900, quoted from M. Tugan-Baranovsky, *The Russian Factory, Past and Present*, vol. 1, 3d ed., St. Petersburg, 1907, p. 446.

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Return to village for seasonal work in their own fields	11.9%
Do not return, having relatives till fields	61.4
Do not farm for themselves, leasing fields	12.3
Own no fields but keep a village homestead	3.6
Without village connections	10.8
Total	100.0%

Here the proportion of workers who still had ties with the rural economy was as high as 89.2 per cent, many times the number of those returning to the village to lend a hand in the fields.

With the growth of industry, especially since that last decade of the nineteenth century, these ties were gradually severed in spite of the laws that held factory workers bound to the "peasant estate." The break was especially open among workers in the metal trades, and even more so in printing. Yet even the printers often remained linked with the farm.

According to a survey made by the Moscow printers union in 1907, 46.0 per cent of all workers employed in Moscow print shops had fields which they tilled themselves or through family labor (mostly the latter); an additional 16.4 per cent leased the fields or kept at least a homestead in their native village. Only 37.6 per cent had cut all property ties with the rural economy. Of all the workers covered by the survey, 65 per cent had been born on farms.[7]

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Hardly any comparable figures are available for the years following World War I.[8] Industrial labor moved farther from its

[7] A. Svavitsky and V. Sher, *The Condition of Workers in the Moscow Printing Industry*, St. Petersburg, 1909, pp. 5 f.

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[8] In this context mention ought to be made of the industrial labor census of 1918, when the workers among other things were asked about their pre-revolutionary connection with agriculture. The results have to be used with caution, however—not only because the questions concerned the past and the answers were accordingly less reliable. A fact of much more profound influence on the survey was that the workers' flight from the factories to the land (due to the disruption of the urban economy and to the agragrian revolution in the country) had set in many months before the census. The rural ties of the remaining part were scarcely representative of industrial labor on the threshold of the revolution. Altogether, out of nearly a million workers whose replies were statistically evaluated, 51.3 per cent said they had owned rural property before the revolution, and two-thirds of these (20.9 per cent) had operated farms, tilling the soil in person or through family labor.

These figures are far too low to correspond with reality just before the revolu-

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farm background, yet strong country connections remained even after 1917. They accounted for the mass exodus of urban workers between 1918 and 1921 and exerted a decisive influence on the trend of unemployment during the first revolutionary years as well as in the later period, between 1922 and 1928.

The trend of industrial manpower in the first revolutionary decade cannot be understood unless it is seen in terms of the rural background of a large proportion of industrial workers. Though industrial employment decreased sharply between 1918 and 1921, there was no visible unemployment. On the contrary, there was a noticeable tightening of the labor market. Conversely, the beginning of industrial recovery and reconstruction in 1922 brought a steady increase in the number of employed along with a considerable increase in the number of unemployed.[9]

Employment Figures until 1928

The first years of the revolution saw a disastrous contraction of the entire economy, particularly of industry. There was an abrupt decrease in the number of employed. Though the nadir of economic decline was reached in the first half of 1921, the shrinkage of employment continued even after the economic policy was reversed with the introduction of the NEP (New Economic Policy). Employers who hitherto, for one reason or another, had hesitated to discharge superfluous workers, did so now, in keeping with the reestablished principles of commercial accounting.

The low point of industrial employment was not reached

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tion. Yet the survey retains a certain significance as an illustration of the relative rural ties of the workers in different branches of industry. If we assume that farms were operated by 20.9 per cent of industrial labor as a whole, we find that the corresponding figure was 38.7 per cent among the miners, 29.2 per cent among the food workers, 26 per cent in the linen industry, 21 per cent among the metal workers, 20.4 per cent in the cotton industry, 19.6 per cent in the lumber industry, and 9.6 per cent in the graphic arts.

The results of this census were published in Russian in *Industry 1913-18-Part Two, Occupational Census* by the Central Statistical Administration, Moscow, 1926. For a comprehensive summary of the results, see A. G. Rashin (cf. note 3), pp. 411-415.

[9] Cf. my articles "Bevölkerungsbewegung und Arbeitslosigkeit in Russland," *Die Gesellschaft*, Berlin, February 1927; "Unemployment in Russia, 1917 to 1925," *International Labour Review*, November 1926; and "The Five-Year Plan and the Regulation of the Labour Market in the U.S.S.R.," *International Labour Review*, March 1933.

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464 until the summer of 1922. It was only after this time that employment in industry and other economic fields rose steadily.

162 464 Some figures may illuminate this trend. The last census of Tsarist Russia, held on February 2, 1897, revealed that, out of a total population of approximately 126,400,000, some 10,500,000 were wage and salary earners (including civil servants but excluding the military). This figure must be corrected to make allowances for the territorial reduction of Russia after World War I; within the borders of the Soviet Union prior to World War II, the number of wage and salary earners in 1897 would have been about 7,900,000 out of a total population of about 104,000,000. For 1913 the corresponding figure (after territorial allowances) has been estimated at 11,200,000, out of a total population of some 140,000,000. But in 1921/22,[10] the number of wage and salary earners[11] had fallen far below the level of 1913, indeed below that of 1897, to about 6,500,000 in a population of approximately 133,000,000.[12]

Conditions in industry proper were worse. Industry (not including handicraft and home workers) employed the following numbers:[13]

1897	1,515,000
1913	2,552,000
1921/22[14]	1,243,000

From the summer of 1922 on, the number of wage and salary earners in the national economy in general and in industry in

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[10] Soviet statistics during the first revolutionary decade were not based on calendar years. Data usually refer to the "economic year" ending September 30.

[11] Data from B. Gukhman, *The Size of the Proletariat and Wages in the USSR*, Moscow, 1926, p. 99.

[12] The number of wage and salary earners in all fields of economic activity for the economic year 1921-22 was never officially released. Such figures are available only since 1922-23, at which time there were 6,800,000. However, the number of wage earners in industry for both years is ascertainable. It was 1,243,400 in 1921-22; 1,445,900 in 1922-23, an increase of 202,500 (data from Gukhman, as quoted *supra*, n. 11, p. 73). The total number of wage and salary earners in all fields of economic activity in 1921-22 may thus be estimated as somewhat less than 6,500,000.

[13] Gukhman, as quoted *supra*, n. 11, pp. 15, 74.

[14] The lowest monthly employment figures were recorded in July, August and September, 1922. The employment trend can be seen from a comparison with the corresponding months of 1921 and 1923 (data from Gukhman, as quoted *supra*, n. 11, pp. 74 ff.):

	1921	*1922*	*1923*
		(in thousands)	
July	1,495	1,191	1,563
August	1,506	1,181	1,559
September	1,253	1,209	1,458

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particular increased continuously. In 1928 the total in all occupational divisions was 11,600,000,[15] for the first time surpassing the 1913 figures. However, the population as a whole had grown rapidly. In 1928 it approximated 151,000,000[16] as against 140,000,000 in 1913. Out of each 1,000 inhabitants, 76.8 were employed as wage or salary earners in 1928. This compares with a ratio of 80.0 in 1913, and of 76.0 in 1897.

The trend was slightly more favorable with respect to manual labor in industry proper (excluding handicraft, home workers, and salaried employees):

Wage Earners in Industry[17]

1897	1,515,000
1913	2,552,000
1928	2,822,000

On the other hand, the number of farm workers dropped considerably over the same period of years, as a result of the agrarian revolution.[18]

It took six years (1922-1928) to restore the working class (statistically speaking, wage and salary earners in all occupational divisions) to the size it had attained prior to World War I. When the Five-Year-Plan policy of speedy industrialization was put into effect, the pace increased rapidly.

The First Five-Year Plan: Project and Achievement

The First Five-Year Plan, as adopted by the Sixteenth Communist Party Conference in April, 1929, was to run from October 1, 1928, to September 30, 1933. Actually it ran its course in less than five years, and was proclaimed to have been completed by December 31, 1932. It was designed to bring about a vast expansion of national production, especially of industrial output. Accordingly, it envisioned a large increase in the number of workers and employees.

However, the authors of the Plan displayed some caution in

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[15] *Socialist Construction of the USSR. Statistical Yearbook*, Moscow, 1936, p. 508.

[16] *Five-Year Plan of Economic Construction of the USSR*, Moscow, 1929, vol. II, 2, p. 165.

[17] Data for 1897 and 1913 from Gukhman, as quoted *supra*, n. 11, p. 89; for 1928, from *Socialist Construction . . .* as quoted *supra*, n. 15, p. 508.

[18] Agricultural laborers numbered approximately 9,775,000 in 1897, 3,000,000 in 1913, and 8,007,000 in 1928, according to sources indicated in n. 17 *supra*.

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mapping out the growth of the working class. The projected increase was to be slower than the actual one in the five years preceding the Five-Year Plan, as can be seen from the following table:[19]

Year	*Number of Employed (in millions)*	*Increase over Preceding year*
	Past Development	
1922/23	6.8	...
1923/24	7.6	11.1%
1924/25	8.5	13.0
1925/26	10.2	19.8
1926/27	11.0	7.8
1927/28	11.3	3.7
	Five-Year Plan Schedule	
1928/29	11.9	4.9
1929/30	12.8	7.5
1930/31	13.8	7.7
1931/32	14.7	7.0
1932/33	15.8	6.9

The relatively moderate pace indicated in these figures for the projected increase in employment was clearly underscored by the authors of the Plan themselves. They wrote:[20]

> "The increase in the number of wage and salary earners, as provided for in the Plan, is relatively moderate as compared with the preceding five years, during which the yearly increases in the number of workers and salaried employees averaged 11 to 12 per cent and the total increase for the period equaled 70 per cent. It is necessary to take into consideration, however, that the growth of the working class during the reconstruction years profited chiefly from the opportunity to use existing plant, while new investment was relatively small; that is to say, this growth took place on the old basis of production. Conversely, employment in the coming five-year period will increase through addition of new, more efficient plant.
>
> "The numerical change in the employment of wage and salary earners, as it is to take place from one year to the other, shows an increase in pace in 1929/30 and a somewhat slowed-up development during the following years. The increase in the

[19] *Five-Year Plan . . .*, as quoted *supra*, n. 18, vol. I, p. 129.
[20] *Op. cit.*, vol. II, 2, pp. 265 f.

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number of wage and salary earners during the five-year period will average about 6 per cent annually."

Altogether, the number of employed was to rise from approximately 11,300,000 in 1927/28 to 15,800,000 in 1932/33,—a total increase of some 4,500,000 or 38.9 per cent.

However, the number of wage and salary earners in the national economy as a whole approximated 22,800,000 in the calendar year 1932, as against the 15,800,000 envisioned for the economic year 1932/33. In less than five years labor more than doubled its size. In industry proper, the figure attained in 1932 was approximately 6,300,000. This compares with 3,106,000 in 1928 and an estimated 4,100,000 for the economic year 1932/33 according to the Five-Year Plan.[21]

The official report on the execution of the First Five-Year Plan summarized the facts as follows: [22]

> "From 1928 to 1932 a total of about 12,500,000 new wage and salary earners were drawn into all occupational divisions (including 1,300,000 who replaced those eliminated by death, disability, or assignment to study). According to preliminary estimates this increase was derived from the following sources: About 4,000,000 were city dwellers working for wages for the first time (viz., 1,700,000 adolescents, some 500,000 college graduates, 1,400,000 adult women not previously engaged in production, and about 400,000 former artisans and home workers). The remaining 8,500,000 were peasants."

The number of newly-employed workers manifestly exceeded the manpower reserves available at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan.[23] This would have been impossible but for the tremendous influx of new workers from the villages. In the second half of the five-year period, however, this tide began visibly to recede. The rural manpower reserves were not exhausted, rather the contrary. But in the meantime something new and decisive had happened to the agrarian economy. The collectivization of

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[21] *Fulfilling the First Five-Year Plan for the Economic Development of the USSR*, Moscow, 1933, pp. 253 f., 267. Later the figures for 1932 were slightly revised upward. According to *Socialist Construction . . .*, as quoted *supra*, n. 15, p. 508, the total number of wage and salary earners was estimated at 22,800,000 and the corresponding figure for industry proper at 6,500,000.

[22] *Fulfilling . . .*, as quoted *supra*, n. 21, p. 174.

[23] For the development of unemployment, cf. Chapter Two below.

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agriculture, which put a new complexion on the labor market, had begun.

Rural Overpopulation and Collectivization of Agriculture

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The effects of the collectivization of agriculture on the labor market are closely interwoven with the age-old crux of Russia's rural economy: rural overpopulation. For many decades it was one of the central issues of the country's social evolution. Due to the limited absorptive capacity of an underdeveloped industry, the population surplus on the farms had become quasi-permanent.

The agrarian revolution did not basically change matters. The big landowners were expropriated, and their lands largely distributed among the peasants, but as the bulk of the land had been in peasant hands even before the revolution, this did not solve the real agrarian problem, the question of "land hunger." The results of the redistribution of land, the People's Commissariat for Agriculture reported in 1920, were "much less than many had anticipated." [34]

Reviewing achievements during the first three years of the Revolution (1917-1920), the People's Commissariat explained: [35] "Small indeed were the results of distributing a giant acreage among the millions of peasants. A special survey by the Central Agricultural Board has found that the *per capita* increase of peasant acreage is very small, amounting to a few tenths or hundredths of a desyatine.[36] In a vast majority of provinces the additional acreage did not exceed half a desyatine; and only in a few did it reach one desyatine."

According to official figures, the average size of peasant holdings in 29 provinces of European Russia rose from 1.67 to 2.26 desyatines *per capita* of the peasant population.[37] The actual increase was even less impressive, for a portion of the newly acquired land had already been tenanted by the peasants prior to the revolution.

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[34] B. N. Knipovich, *Summary of Three Years' Activity (1917-1920) of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture*, issued by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, Moscow, 1920, p. 9.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] One desyatine is equivalent to 1.093 hectares=2.6997 acres.

[37] From data cited in the Rumian-language publication by S. N. Prokopovicz, *Studies in Soviet Economy*, Berlin, 1925, p. 70.

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Thus the redistribution of land could do little to ease the pressure of rual overpopulation. Whatever slight improvement there was, was largely offset by a new migration from the cities to the country that began in the first year of the Revolution, and by the damage that war and civil war had inflicted on agriculture. The density of the rural population remained menacing. It had actually grown in comparison with prewar days, as shown by the following table:[28]

Male Adult Farm Workers Per 100 Desyatines of Arable Land

Region	*1913*	*1923*	*Ratio 1923:1913*
Western	10.5	13.9	1.32
Northwestern	14.4	13.8	.96
Central Industrial	11.0	18.7	1.70
Northeastern	11.1	15.6	1.41
Wyatka-Vetluga	10.1	11.7	1.16
Ural	7.2	8.7	1.21
Central Agrarian	13.5	15.4	1.14
Middle Volga	10.8	12.3	1.14
Lower Volga	6.9	7.5	1.09
Crimea	3.4	3.9	1.15

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The change in ownership did nothing to change the fact that the numbers of employables working on farms exceeded that required for cultivation. On the basis of rural tax returns for 1924/25, N. Organovsky, an authority on farm statistics, showed that the per capita amount of work accomplished increases with the size of the farm. The acreage planted per person was as follows:

Size of Farm	*Desyatines Planted per Person*
Small (up to 4 desyatines)	0.58
Lower medium (4 to 8 desyatines)	1.38
Upper medium (8 to 15 desyatines)	2.13
Large (more than 15 desyatines)	3.56
All brackets	1.42

Oganovsky commented: [29]

[28] Data from N. Kondrat'yev and N. Oganovsky, *The Conditions for the Development of Agriculture in the Soviet Union*, issued by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, Moscow, 1924, p. 128.

[29] N. Oganovsky, "Results of the Agrarian Revolution and Recent Differentiation Trends within the Peasantry," *Planovoye Khozyaistvo*, May 1925, pp. 55 f.

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> "If the small farmers could utilize their working capacity as efficiently as the lower medium farmers, the labor of 57 per cent of the former would be superfluous; if working efficiency in the lowest bracket could be increased to the level of the upper medium group, the proportion of unusable manpower among the small farmers would amount to 73 per cent. Now, the total available manpower in the small-farmer category throughout the Soviet Union amounts to 13,100,000. Consequently, in the small-farmer category, on the basis of the productivity of labor in the lower medium bracket, the number of persons employed in excess of requirements totals 7,500,000; computed on the basis of the degree of productivity characteristic of the upper medium bracket, it would come to 9,600,000. In addition, using this latter ratio, the number of persons employed in excess of requirements in the lower-medium category may be calculated at 10,300,000. This would bring the total unusable manpower up to 19,900,000, or 43 per cent of the manpower in the villages of the Soviet Union."

Though the data on which these computations were based may not have been wholly accurate, the general picture was true. The extent of rural overpopulation in the Soviet Union was enormous.

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For the moment, migrations to the city could hardly be expected to bring relief. Not only did the rural population overbalance the urban one; there also was its high rate of natural increase. It was not until the middle 1930's that the cities had grown enough to absorb at least the natural rural population increase in the course of their further expansion, lessening the overcrowding on the farms.

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This was still far off when the Five-Year Plan era began. In percentage, the First Five-Year Plan foresaw a relatively slight increase in the size of the rural population: 9.0 per cent in five years, as against a 24.4 per cent increase in the cities. In absolute figures, however, the rural increase thus envisioned considerably exceeded that planned for the cities. The rural population was to grow by 11,100,000, as against 6,800,000 for the urban one.[20] The actual development was different. It was deeply influenced

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[20] The rural population was seen increasing from [illegible] in 1927-28 to 134,500,000 in 1932-33, while the urban population was expected to advance during the same time from 27,900,000 to 34,700,000. (Data from *Five-Year Plan . . .*, as quoted *supra*, n. 16, vol. I, p. 129.)

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conditions being equal, the expenditure of labor per unit of acreage is less on collective farms than in independent peasant holdings: large-scale farming favors labor-saving division of work.

This was clearly shown by an investigation which the *Kolkhoz* Center (an agency operating under the People's Commissariat for Agriculture) conducted in 1930 in four districts of the Ukraine, North Caucasus, the Central Black-Soil Area, and Siberia. Collective farms using larger-sized equipment unknown to the small peasant farmer were excluded, to eliminate differences in the level of mechanization. In terms of man-days of male adults per hectare of planted acreage, expenditure of labor was as follows: [34]

	Fall Planting		*Spring Planting*	
	Collective Farms	*Independent Peasant Farms*	*Collective Farms*	*Independent Peasant Farms*
Ukraine	5.31	7.89	...	...
North Caucasus	5.61	11.16	5.48	7.80
Central Black-Soil Area	7.22	11.41	7.46	12.23
Siberia	...	...	5.54	16.99

The difference in size alone makes for a considerable saving of labor in collective farming. Introduction of heavy machinery, spurred by collectivization, is another labor-saving device. To determine the expenditure of labor before and after mechanization of the principal phases of agricultural work (cultivation and harvesting), another study was carried out by the *Kolkhoz* Institute (People's Commissariat for Agriculture) in October, 1930. This survey of 68 collective farms scattered all over the country disclosed a labor saving of 48.2 per cent for spring seeds, and of 50.2 per cent for autumn seeds, by means of mechanization.[35]

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Numerous surveys have shown that collective agriculture can use only a fraction of the total available manpower. In 1930 a study of 102 *kolkhozes* revealed that days worked per able-bodied person averaged not more than one hundred a year. Even in August, the busiest month in agricultural work, the number of days worked per able-bodied *kolkhoz* member averaged eighteen in

[34] I. Ramikov, "Release of Manpower by Collective Farms, and the Tasks of Organizing *Otkhod*," *Na Agrarnom Fronte*, June, 1931, p. 58.

[35] *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

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Bashkiria, fourteen in the North Caucasus and the Leningrad and Western areas, and only eight in the Ivanovo area.[36]

Still less satisfactory was the situation uncovered by other surveys: "A survey by the Research Institute for Large-scale Farming disclosed that in the Volga area only 18.9 per cent of the available manpower was utilized by the *arteli* and 28.7 per cent by the *kommuny;*[37] in the North Caucasus, 18.3 per cent by the former and 38.1 per cent by the latter. According to a comprehensive study undertaken by the *Kolkhoz* Institute in 1930 and based on production plans, less than half the available manpower was used on 31.0 per cent of all collective farms in the Central Black-Soil Region, on 31.6 per cent in the Ukraine, on 25 per cent in the Middle-Volga Area, etc."[38]

As efficiency of work improved with the development of collectivized agriculture, the manpower surplus became more pronounced. Labor expenditures per unit of acreage in a large number of *kolkhozes* under survey in 1933 and 1937 compared as follows:[39]

	Days Worked per Hectare of Grain Acreage		
Area	*1933*	*1937*	*Ratio 1937:1933*
Azov-Black-Sea	8.67	6.96	.803
Voronezh	14.68	10.63	.724
Western Siberia	9.91	8.27	.835
Kalinin	28.43	26.65	.937
White Russia	25.55	19.42	.825
Ukraine	11.32	10.45	.923
Average	12.30	10.55	.856

The figures may not always be reliable in every detail, as the surveys from which they were drawn had the primary purpose of proving the presence of large manpower reserves in the *kolkhoz* organization. Still, they may be assumed to give a correct picture of the basic trend.

There is no doubt that at first the *kolkhozes* could make efficient use of only part of the manpower available in a peasant

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[36] Op. cit., p. 35.

[37] *Arteli* and *kommuny* are different organizational types of collective farms.

[38] A. Likhtenstein, *Agrarian Overpopulation and Collectivization of the Villages*, issued by the Agrarian Institute of the Communist Academy, Moscow, 1931, p. 182.

[39] I. Maryasov, "Productivity of Labor in the *Kolkhozes*," *Planovoye Khozyaistvo*, December, 1935, pp. 142 f.

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464 241 654 economy. With farming collectivized and mechanized, the total rural labor force capable of economically efficient agricultural employment diminished considerably. Did this not justify the expectation that collectivization would rapidly aggravate the pressure of rural overpopulation and spur migration to the cities?

In fact, developments were much more complicated and led to various contradictory trends.

Collectivization of Agriculture and Urban Labor Market

369 166 464 In the early years of forcible collectivization, many millions of peasants left for the city. Eight and a half million workers from the country were absorbed by the urban labor market between 1928 and 1932. Most of them, however, did not come from collective farms. They were cast-offs of the collectivization process: either formerly well-to-do peasants who had been "dekulakized"—expropriated and expelled—or pauperized independents who balked at joining the *kolkhozes*.

Within the "collectivized sector," on the other hand, it soon turned out that collectivization, despite its labor-saving effect, kept farmers from migrating to the city and often made it imperative for industrial workers to return to the villages whence they had come long ago.

The first year of forcible collectivization, 1929/30, already showed the extent to which the urban labor market was upset by the agrarian upheaval. Early in 1930, the newspapers were full of items about the new phenomenon of "flight from the cities." Workers who had remained economically linked with the farm rushed back there, lest they miss out in the agrarian reshuffle.

The greatest number of such reports came from mining districts, where the semi-peasant was a common type. The following dispatches were typical:

> "The mines are being deserted. Miner, construction worker, mechanic, each and every one is off to the country to the *kolkhoz*. What else can you expect? That's where their families are. And whoever stays away from the *kolkhoz* is in danger of being branded a *kulak* by the blundering local officials." [40]
>
> "In their administrative zeal the collectivization reformers

[40] *Za Industrializatsiyu*, March 22, 1930.

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failed to remember that 30 per cent of the miners have farms of their own, and have subjected the families of these miners to so much pressure that their husbands, brothers and fathers are now deluged with letters urging them to come home as soon as possible, to 'save the farm.' In many cases, miners' farms were simply expropriated as *kulak* property and their families refused membership in the *kolkhozes*. It is not surprising that hordes of excited miners have been running for home." [41]

As a rule, Soviet newspapers confined themselves to attributing the miners' flight from the mines to "blundering" enforcement of collectivization by overzealous officials. But the real cause was a phenomenon far more serious than individual excesses.

Under normal conditions, work in the mines was a customary objective of the so-called "temporary migration" (*otkhod, otkhodnichestvo*) of farm labor. Without giving up their farms, peasant families who were not fully employed in agriculture would move temporarily to take industrial or semi-industrial seasonal jobs. The collectivization of agriculture upset the urban labor market peculiarly through its effect on *otkhod*. While increasing the manpower surplus on the farms, it reduced the industrial labor supply which temporary migration had normally provided.

Those peasants who had not yet been forced into *kolkhozes* feared to leave for the city or for temporary work lest absence furnish a pretext for expropriating their farms. Those who had already joined collective farms were even more averse to leaving their villages, because they risked discrimination within the *kolkhoz*: with too many people working on collective farms, there was a tendency to withhold work assignments from families whose sons, brothers or fathers were absent and drew pay from non-farm jobs.

The Soviet press during that period constantly discussed the decrease of *otkhod*. "The ratio of collectivization" was said to be "in inverse proportion to the ratio of *otkhod*." In other words, the farther collectivization progressed, the more the number of those willing to accept permanent or temporary employment in the city dwindled. Figures from several areas may illustrate this "inverse proportion": [42]

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[41] *Trud*, April 15, 1930.

[42] Ya. Brandstein, "The Manpower Issue in the Third Year of the Five-Year Plan," *Planovoye Khozyaistvo*, December, 1930, p. 201.

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Area	Per cent Farms Collectivized	Number of Otkhodniki Per 1,000 Rural Inhabitants
Mordva	8.9	47.4
Penza	11.0	20.8
Kuznetsk	11.9	28.6
Syzran'	18.1	36.5
Ul'yanovsk	18.7	30.2
Buguruslan	31.1	25.4
Samara	35.6	17.4
Orenburg	40.2	12.7

This decrease in "temporary migration" noticeably reduced the labor supply in the cities. The difficulties of filling industry's requirements multiplied apace. Repeated attempts at legislative or administrative remedial action (cf. Chapter Two below) were only partially successful.

Urbanization Trends

464 Today there can no longer be any doubt that the half-rustic nature of the Russian working class was due to the prevalence of the small peasant farm, an economic unit that could neither sustain nor adequately occupy the peasant family. If he could not make a livelihood on the farm, the peasant went to the city to look for work and often stayed for the major part of the year. For the head of the family to take industrial or semi-industrial jobs was not only economically feasible but often imperative. Frequently it was more profitable to hire a farm hand for a while than to have the head of the family forego remunerative non-farm employment. Collectivization changed all that.

Of course, rural overpopulation did not disappear and did not even lessen appreciably. In fact, collectivization initially served to increase the manpower surplus on the farms.[a] And yet, *otkhod* declined. Besides, there appeared a new phenomenon, a pronounced "flight from the city." Even old industrial workers, loyal to industry during the stormy years of collectivization (1929-

[a] The opposite trend did not become apparent until several years later. Then, in the late 1930's, new projects were launched on the collective farms and new employment possibilities materialized, provided by soil improvement and conservation, cultivation of commercial plants, construction work, etc. This "industrialization" of agriculture tended to ease the pressure of overpopulation.

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1931), seemed to gravitate back to the farm now that the *kolhozes* were growing strong.

Thus the official newspaper for industry wrote in 1934: [44]

> "Considerable changes in the composition of the labor force in the Donets mines are more clearly visible from year to year. Whereas the Donets Basin used to have a surplus of manpower in the winter months, today whole trusts, not just single mines, complain of manpower shortages . . . Nearly 50 per cent of the workers of the OGPU Mine (250 people) have announced their intention to quit, and more than a hundred add that they want to go 'home,' to the village. Things are no better in the largest mines of the Kadiyev coal trust, such as 'Il'yitch,' 'Krivoroh'ye,' etc. Unfortunately, the case of the Kadiyev coal trust is by no means exceptional."

The industry newspaper sounded a warning: "There are not a few jobs being quit by miners who have been at work in the mines for eight or ten years." The same trend, though less conspicuously, showed up in other industries. It was surely no accident that in 1933, despite a 600,000 drop in industrial employment, there were no visible signs of unemployment in the urban labor market.

Yet although *otkhod* in the usual sense decreased and in addition there were people leaving the cities, a cross-current set in eventually.

In the most turbulent years in the countryside (principally 1930 and 1931) a stream of people moved from the villages into the cities. Certainly it is no accident that Soviet novels, dealing with the workers' life in factories and above all on the vast industrial construction jobs of the early thirties, keep bringing up "de-kulakized" and "*kulak* children." But this movement did not map with the *kulaks*. It was soon clear that the families of *kolkhoz* members also furnished multitudes of "country fugitives," although the influx of migrants from the *kolkhozes* was not large enough to meet the manpower demands of urban industry.

Taking place in already collectivized agriculture, this new exodus differed essentially from earlier peasant migrations. The bulk of the migrants no longer were heads of families, departing for a time. They were no longer interested in keeping their eco-

[44] *Za Industrializatsiyu*, March 18, 1934.

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nomic connections with the farm. Increasing numbers resembled the majority of rural migrants in Western and Central Europe, young people who did not care to farm any more, who were ready to become city folks. They came to represent what was to Russia a rather new type: the urbanized industrial worker.

In 1934 a correspondent of the official industry newspaper drew a vivid picture of the change: [65]

> "The social composition of the workers who apply for work in the mines has changed; so has their attitude toward the mine. There was a time when the most common sight in the Donets coal mines was the temporary migrant who would spend part of the year working in the mine and would return to his village in summer, year in, year out. In recent years, quite a few of these workers have definitely settled down in the mining towns, while others have gone back to the country for good . . . But a completely new type of worker has been coming from the country. These are people who have not yet made up their minds where they will ultimately settle, near the mine or back in the village."

The same correspondent quoted figures taken from surveys among Donets miners in 1929 and 1932. The proportion of country-bred miners had not changed in those years; they numbered 61.5 per cent of the total in 1929, and 61.9 per cent in 1932. And yet an essential transformation had taken place. While 27.8 per cent of the miners interviewed in 1929 maintained close economic connections with the country, the corresponding figure in 1932 was only 17.9 per cent. In 1929, 10.1 per cent of the miners questioned had taken leave of absence to do farm labor during the busy season, in 1932 only 0.5 per cent.[66]

The disengagement of industrial labor from its rural background was in full swing.

Working Class Growth from 1932 to 1941

115 Under the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932), the grand total of wage and salary earners rose from 11,600,000 to 22,900,000. This was far in excess of the goal set by the Plan, and caused misgivings among government and industrial leaders. In the fall

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[65] *Za Industrializatsiyu*, February 14, 1934.
[66] *Ibid.*

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of 1931 the Supreme Economic Council issued a circular letter (published October 30, 1931) which directed the management of all industrial plants "instantly" to bring the number employed in line with the level of industrial production, and henceforth to refrain from hiring new personnel unless specifically authorized. And when the trade union daily, *Trud*, ventured, in December, 1931, to announced a further increase in employment for 1932, the responsible editor was fired for violation of government directives.[47]

However, the increase in the number of wage and salary earners in the whole economy envisioned for 1932 was still considerable. It was to rise from 18,700,000 to 21,000,000, i.e., 12.3 per cent.[48] Details of the projected expansion were not released, but official comment indicated that the new personnel would be recruited mainly by employing more apprentices and apparently also more construction workers. On the whole, the government for the time being showed reluctance to increase industrial employment any further.[49]

Again, actual developments surpassed Plan estimates. In 1932 employment reached a new high. It rose 20.8 instead of 12.3 per cent, tantamount to an additional employment of 4,000,000.[50]

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[47] The incident was mentioned in *Trud* when it occurred. This once, I am unable to furnish an exact reference to the source. In Paris, during the war, I lost my file of *Trud*, and this newspaper has not been completely preserved in this country. Shortly after the incident occurred I related it at length in an article "Unemployment Again?" in the Russian-language *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik* (*Socialist Courier*), Berlin, 1932, No. 3.

[48] *Izvestiya*, December 26, 1931.

[49] Official reluctance toward further expansion in industrial employment found its expression in an editorial of the official trade union newspaper (*Trud*, January 21, 1932), which said: "This year the increase in the productivity of labor will be based chiefly on the most rigidly planned restriction of the number of wage and salary earners. The basic attitude of the Plan for 1932 is decisive reversal of the attitude toward hiring new employees . . . The increase in the number of wage and salary earners during the year will be very moderate as compared with the figure for the end of last year. Industrial establishments controlled by the Supreme Economic Council will hardly employ more workers on the yearly average than they did during the last quarter of 1931. Average railroad employment for the year will be 30,000 less than during the last quarter of the preceding year. Employees on the pay roll of the administration and public institutions will be reduced in number in 1932, in accordance with the directive for cutbacks in administrative expenses. The only group which, according to the Plan, is to undergo a further rapid increase is the apprentices; the number of apprentices is to increase 52 per cent in industrial establishments controlled by the Supreme Economic Council, 70 per cent in rail transport, 53 per cent in waterway transport, etc."

[50] Railroads as well as the administration and public institutions had been instructed to carry out cutbacks in 1932. Instead, there was increase in employment in both occupational divisions by 200,000 each. Cf. *Socialist Construction* . . ., as quoted *supra*, n. 15, p. 508

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464 For the first time since the start of large-scale economic planning, a substantial cut in employment was foreseen in the annual plan for 1933—from 22,900,000 to 21,300,000[51]—but the actual decrease was only 600,000 instead of 1,600,000.[52]

From 1934 on, employment climbed anew. The Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937), passed in the beginning of 1934, envisioned a 6,000,000 increase in the number of wage and salary earners in all occupational divisions, from 22,900,000 to 28,900,000, a gain of 26.0 per cent.[53]

But while the First Five-Year Plan had seen its estimates far exceeded, the Second Five-Year Plan failed to see them fulfilled. Though the projected rate of increase was modest in comparison with that of the previous Plan, it was not attained. By 1937 the number of employed had risen 4,000,000 instead of 6,000,000, i.e., 17.6 instead of 26.0 per cent.[54]

Supplying industry with labor was more difficult than foreseen. Accordingly, a lower rate of increase was projected for the Third Five-Year Plan (1938-1942): total employment was to rise from 27,000,000 to 32,700,000 or 21.0 per cent.[55] On the eve of the war it seemed likely that this Plan would succeed; according to data published in 1941, the number employed in 1940 totaled 30,400,000, with 31,600,000 planned for 1941.[56]

How did this affect labor's share within the total population? The census of January 19, 1939 showed the population of the Soviet Union as 170,500,000. By 1940, it presumably approximated 174,000,000. This would account for a ratio of 175 wage and salary earners per thousand inhabitants, as compared with 77 per thousand in 1928, and 80 in 1913.

The numerical increase in wage workers and salaried employees under the three Five-Year Plans can be summarized in the following figures:

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51 *Izvestiya*, January 31, 1933.

52 The number employed was reduced by 250,000 in industry and by as much as 750,000 in building (approximately). This was compensated for by additional employment in a number of other occupational divisions. Cf. *Socialist Construction . . .*, as quoted *supra*, n. 15, p. 508

53 *Second Five-Year Plan for the National Economy of the USSR*, Moscow, 1934, vol I, pp. 504 f.

54 *Results of Fulfilling the Second Five-Year Plan*, Moscow, 1939, p. 104.

55 *Resolutions of the Eighteenth Convention of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1939, p. 56.

56 Nikolai A. Voznesensky, "The Economic Results of the Year 1940 and the Plan for the Economic Development of the USSR for 1941. Report to the Eighteenth Conference of the CPSU," *Bol'shevik*, 1941, Nos. 3-4, p. 55.

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Working Class Growth from 1928 to 1942

	Employment (in millions)		
	Last Year Before Plan	*Last Year Under Plan*	
		proposed	chieved
1st Five-Year Plan[57] (1928/29-32)	11.5	15.8	22.9
2nd Five-Year Plan (1933-37)	22.9	28.9	27.0
3rd Five-Year Plan (1938-42)	27.0	32.7	...

	Per Cent Increase	
	Plan Estimate	*Actual*
1st Five-Year Plan (1928/29-1932)	38.9	102.0
2nd Five-Year Plan (1933-1937)	26.0	17.6
3rd Five-Year Plan (1938-1942)	21.0	....

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The enormous growth of the working class in less than one and a half decades of overall planning is a fact of great sociological importance, especially as the stratification of labor also underwent substantial changes. There was a marked increase in the proportion of manual workers, in particular in industry proper. Both processes involved transformations which reshaped the social pattern of the country.

At this point we shall add a few additional remarks on the growth of the working class, in so far as it reveals the metamorphosis of Russian labor—the formation of a new working class without rural ties.

Out of 12,500,000 new wage and salary earners who swelled the ranks of labor under the First Five-Year Plan, roughly 8,500,000 had come from the peasantry. Under the Second Five-Year Plan the industrial manpower supply was to depend much less on the rural influx. The number of employed was to rise by 6,000,000 from 1932 to 1937; in addition, 3,400,000 were needed to replace those eliminated by death, disability, etc. Of this total of 9,400,000 new wage and salary earners, only 3,200,000 were to be recruited on the farms; nearly two-thirds had to come from the cities.[58]

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[57] Under the First Five-Year Plan, figures proposed for the fifth year refer to the economic year of 1932-33, figures of actual results to the calendar year 1932.

[58] *Second Five-Year Plan . . .*, as quoted *supra*, n. 53, vol. I, pp. 358 f.

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185 964 Not even this modest influx from the countryside was certain; the authors of the Second Plan did not expect it to flow automatically, but proposed to assure it by rigorous labor control measures. With the scope of rural migration not safely predictable, the problem of mobilizing the urban manpower reserves—particularly that of inducing housewives to work for wages—assumed paramount importance. (See below, Chapter Two.)

The scarcity of statistical material prevents an exact analysis of these trends between 1932 and 1937. The increase in the total number of wage and salary earners lagged considerably behind the Plan estimate. But there was a very substantial rise in the industrial employment of women. As a recruitment source of industrial labor, the city obviously played an even larger part than it had been assigned in the Plan. It is safe to assume that this trend has gained in significance during the subsequent years.

The Working Class in the War and Postwar Years

964 722 The war added considerable momentum to the trend here described. Above all, it brought on an acute labor shortage. Industry had to give up a great many workers for service in the armed forces. No data were ever published on the number of military draftees nor on that of occupational exemptions and deferments;[10] neither were there any indications as to the rules which governed releases from draft on occupational grounds. As far as can be judged from reports on conditions in industry, only limited numbers of workers subject to military service were retained in the plants (especially in the first one to one-and-a-half years of the war), and only among skilled workers in war industry proper was there a considerable percentage of exemptions.

Even more affected by the draft was rural labor, an import-

[702] [10] The information available on the numbers of persons drafted into the armed forces, or classes called up, is neither exact nor comprehensive. According to unverified data circulating outside of the Soviet Union, the wartime draft covered men between 18 and 54 or 55 and comprised 37 or 38 classes (probably taking into account the age shifts in wartime). To a certain extent this assumption is borne out by official data on discharges. The first three demobilization orders (*Pravda*, June 24, and September 26, 1945; March 21, 1946) referred to 13, 10 or 6 classes respectively, a total of 29. After these 29 classes had been discharged, the Soviet Union retained armed forces far in excess of peacetime effectives. The fourth demobilization act (*Pravda*, October 25, 1946) merely ordered the discharge of "the *seriatim* oldest age group."

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ant source of manpower for industry, and notably for "mass projects" which did not require special skills. Suffice it to say that the proportion of women in the able-bodied rural population had risen from 52 per cent at the beginning of 1939 to 71 per cent at the beginning of 1943.[40] The farm population diminished so rapidly in the early stages of the war that organized recruitment of manpower on the farms (see Chapter Two) had to be discontinued in the first war year. The conscription of city dwellers for farm work was finally introduced in 1942 (see Chapter Three).

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Under these circumstances the greatest possible utilization of urban labor reserves became a necessity. Above all, it manifested itself in a vast increase in female industrial labor (see Chapter Two). In addition, the employment of youth in industry was greatly expanded, and older workers, already eliminated from the labor process, were "re-activated." The result was a shift in the age structure of the industrial working class. Between 1939 and 1942 the quota of boys and girls under eighteen rose from 6 to 15 per cent of the total industrial labor force, the quota of workers from eighteen to forty-nine years of age dropped from 85 to 73 per cent, and the quota of older workers, aged fifty or more, rose from 9 to 12 per cent.[41] A definite compilation of the figures for male and female industrial workers would have made the shift in the male age groups even more evident. Nor was the process completed by 1942. There were simply no later statistics published.

However significant, the influx of these new workers could not insure the replenishment of the war-depleted plant labor pools. Between 1940 and 1945, there was a 38 per cent drop in the number of workers and employees in the whole economy and administration.[42] In industry proper, while less marked, it still amounted to 31 per cent.[43] Of course, this drop was partly due to the fact that important areas of the Soviet Union were still German-occupied in 1943, and economic reconstruction in the parts already liberated had only just begun. But even in 1945, when the war was over and the work of reconstruction far advanced, the number of employed workers remained considerably below pre-war levels.

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[40] N. A. Voznesensky, *The War Economy of the USSR in the Period of the War for the Fatherland*, Moscow, 1947, p. 113.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 112 f.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 109.
[43] Calculated on the basis of Voznesensky's figures, *ibid.*, p. 109.

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464 It has been mentioned before that the over-all total of wage workers and salaried employees in all branches of the Soviet economy and administration had reached 30,400,000 by 1940. This figure referred to the Soviet Union within its old borders. Expansion has since increased the Soviet population by some 14 per cent, and the 1940 employment totals in present Soviet territory must have substantially surpassed the figure of 30,400,000. Yet by 1945 the total number of manual and white-collar workers employed within the Soviet boundaries amounted to no more than 27,250,000.[64]

464 727 Toward the end of the war, and in the first postwar year, frequent complaints of an extraordinary labor shortage appeared in the Soviet press. The first news referred to peat. Only 76,200 workers worked on peat banks operated by the People's Commissariat for Power Generation, the main consumer of peat, by April 1, 1945, as against 97,800 a year earlier.[65] This, of course, may have been influenced by specific conditions.

But things were no better in textiles, although the textile industry as a whole suffered least from the war, as relatively few textile plants were located in occupied territory. Nevertheless, the press recorded in October, 1945, that plant and equipment in textile factories were largely idle for lack of manpower.[66] In March, 1946, it was announced on the floor of the Supreme Soviet that because of the labor shortage "about one-third of all spindles and looms in textile factories of Moscow city and Moscow province [were] kept in reserve, out of operation."[67] Machinery was also idle in the textile plants of Ivanovo province,[68] next to Moscow the largest textile district of the USSR. According to Aleksei N. Kosygin, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the total number employed in the textile industry dropped from 808,000 in 1940 to 400,000 in 1946.[69]

Similar conditions prevailed in hosiery, clothing, leather, shoe factories and other light-industry establishments. In Octo-

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[64] Calculated on the basis of figures announced by Vomesensky, in reporting to the Supreme Soviet on the Fourth Five-Year Plan. S. *Proceedings in the 1st Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*, March, 1946, p. 66.

[65] *Pravda*, April 8, 1945.

[66] *Pravda*, October 28, 1945.

[67] Georgi M. Popov, deputy from Moscow, speaking during debates on the Fourth Five-Year Plan, *Proceedings . . .*, as quoted *supra*, n. 64, p. 256.

[68] *Pravda*, April 20, 1946.

[69] *Proceedings . . .*, as quoted *supra*, n. 64, p. 156.

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ber, 1945, an official announcement referring to these industries said:[70] "In many factories . . . equipment is not being utilized, remaining idle because of lack of workers." In March, 1946, Vice-Premier Kosygin said[71] that "the number of workers in these industries contracted considerably" in comparison with prewar standards.

Naturally, coal mining, too, was seriously affected. Even metallurgy and metal manufactures which enjoyed manpower priorities during the war reported instances of acute manpower shortage. "Not enough workers" was indicated in October, 1945, as the chief reason why industrial plants in Yaroslavl failed to comply with plan assignments, and it was stressed that metal plants there were the worst hit.[72] At a session of the Supreme Soviet in March, 1946, Piotr F. Lomako, Minister for Non-Ferrous Industry, complained about the shortage of workers in plants under his Ministry.[73] Of course, the complaints of metallurgical and metal-manufacturing plants seemed almost reassuring, compared with the manpower tragedy that befell the textile industry and kindred consumer goods manufactures.

The Soviet leaders knew well that no large-scale influx of manpower from rural areas could be counted on to overcome these difficulties. In March, 1946, when the Fourth Five-Year Plan was confirmed, it was decided to resume the so-called organized enlistment of workers in the *kolkhozes;* but no great results seem to have been expected from this measure, and the main stress was laid on the mass production of skilled and semi-skilled labor by the occupational training of youth (see Chapter Two).

A few data may illustrate this. When the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-50) was drawn up, the total number of workers and employees in all economic and administrative branches was set at 33,500,000 for 1950 as against 27,250,000 in 1945.[74] The number of manual workers projected for industry proper in 1950 was not announced, and neither was the actual one in 1945. But as the latest available Soviet figures place the number of manual workers in industry (including apprentices and the so-called "lower

[70] A. Shchegolev [the People's Commisar for Light Industry of the RSFSR], "Light-Industry Potentialities," *Pravda*, October 20, 1945.
[71] See n. 69 above.
[72] *Izvestiya*, October 26, 1945.
[73] *Proceedings . . .*, as quoted *supra*, n. 64, p. 300.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

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185 service personnel") at somewhat less than one-third of the total employed labor force,[75] we may estimate that they numbered about 9,000,000 in 1945, and about 11,000,000 (according to plan) in 1950.

[883] In planning to add about two million more industrial workers, the number of juveniles to be enlisted and trained for skilled or semi-skilled labor in the course of the Five-Year Plan had been set at 4,500,000. While part of these were not to be trained for industry proper but for transportation and the building trades, which in the Soviet Union do not count as industrial branches, the bulk was—and still is—destined for industry. Even if we take regular replacement requirements into consideration, we find that an overwhelming majority of the new industrial workers was to consist of these juvenile trainees.

A great many of them are, of course, drafted from rural areas. (For more on that subject, and on this form of occupational training in general, see Chapter Two). Once trained, however, they do not go back to the country. Their assimilation into industrial labor is final. They no longer resemble the traditional half-rustic type of Russian worker.

Actual developments under the Fourth Five-Year Plan differed in detail from the projected ones. In particular, the total of workers and employees rose faster than had been envisioned, while the occupational training program could not quite produce the planned number of new, young workers. But in principle there was no change.

The plan envisioned a five-year increase of 6,250,000 in the total of workers and employees. In fact, the number of those employed in all economic and administrative branches rose as follows: [76]

[75] According to the figures for 1937, workers and employees in all economic and administrative branches numbered 26,969,700, and manual workers in industry proper 8,827,500, or 32.7 per cent. For the year 1942 the draft of the Third Five-Year Plan estimated the total of workers and employees at 32,000,000 and the total of workers in industry proper at 10,514,000, or 32.2 per cent. Calculated according to figures quoted in *The Third Five-Year Plan of National Economic Development in the USSR* (Draft). Moscow, 1939. pp. 228-29.

[76] Taken from the yearly economic progress reports on the years 1946-50, published by the Central Statistical Administration in *Izvestiya* of January 21, 1947, January 18, 1948, January 20, 1949, January 18, 1950, and January 27, 1951. In the 1950 report, unlike those on the years from 1946 to 1949, the increase in employ-

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in 1946 by 3,000,000
" 1947 " 1,200,000
" 1948 " 2,000,000
" 1949 " 1,800,000
" 1950 " 2,200,000

Thus the five-year increase was not 6,250,000, as it should have been according to plan, but approximately 10,200,000, and by 1950 the total number of workers and employees had not reached 35,500,000 but nearly 37,500,000. Correspondingly the number of manual industrial workers reached between 12,000,000 and 12,500,000 in 1950—an increase over 1945 of from 5,000,000 to 5,500,000. The number of juveniles drafted for occupational training and trained amounted to some 5,400,000 in the five years (see Chapter Two). The influx into industry of the specially trained juveniles remained decisive.

Another interesting point shown by these statistics is the unusually sharp rise in employment figures during 1946, although in that particular year the number of juveniles delivered to industry by the occupational training program was a modest 382,000. The bulk of the new manpower in 1946 came from another source, and the assumption suggests itself that an unexpectedly large number of men discharged from the army sought and found employment as manual and white-collar workers. Hundreds of thousands, possibly millions who went to war from the villages and had as yet no families of their own did not return to their villages after the war years. Instead, they were absorbed into the

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ment is not given as an anual average. Instead, the total of workers and employees at the end of 1950 is given as 39,000,000, and at the same time this figure is said to exceed that of the end of 1949 by 2,000,000. As we know from the quarterly reports on the first nine months of 1950 (*Izvestiya* of April 27, July 28, and October 25, 1950) that the average employment totals in these quarters exceeded the corresponding figures for 1949 by 2,000,000, 2,500,000, and 2,500,000, respectively, we may assume that the annual average of workers and employees increased by 2,000,000 from 1949 to 1950, and that the average for 1950 was close to 37,500,000.

As the number of workers and employees rose approximately evenly, the difference between the annual average and the figure at the year's end should amount to about half the annual increase. For 1950 that would mean about 1,000,000—some 200,000 less than the difference between the nearly 37,500,000 just calculated as the 1950 average and the 39,000,000 announced as the end-of-the-year figure. Presumably this discrepancy is due to the fact that some social group not previously classified as "workers and employees" was now counted in that category—perhaps the students of the occupational training schools of the so-called "State Labor Reserve" (cf. Chapter Two).

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414 727 great mass of urban workers and employees, partly by the lower administrative machine. They, too, turned into workers who ceased to resemble the half-rustic worker type.

Today the process of developing a modern working class without rural ties is all but completed in the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX

Statistical Material on the Working Class

414 162 Available statistical data on the development of industrial labor in Russia during the last half-century are not easily compared and summarized. Statistical methods and sociological classifications differed so widely during the period under review that the coördination of individual data meets with great obstacles.

Data on the number of wage and salary earners vary considerably according to different sources. But if their juxtaposition in a single table would hardly make sense, the statistical evidence on hand can be presented in several individual surveys.

A study published in 1926 by a Soviet author [77] offers processed census data which may be used for the purposes of the present survey. The following table draws on this particular source, presenting material for the period from 1897 to 1924. All data refer to the pre-1939 territory of the Soviet Union, for both the Soviet period and the pre-revolutionary period:

Wage and Salary Earners in Russia

(in thousands)

	1897	*1913*	*1922/23*	*1923/24*
Grand Total	7,905	11,200	6,636	7,397
Thereof:				
Industry, all classes	2,202	3,636	1,958	2,150
(a) large-scale	1,622	2,776	1,659	1,815
(b) small-scale	580	860	300	335
Railroads	547	705	862	875
Communications	57	72	92	87
Commerce	367	451	506	580
Agriculture	2,775	3,000	1,100	1,300

[77] B. Gukhman, *The Size of the Proletariat and Wages in the USSR*, Moscow, 1926, p. 29.

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Official publications under the Five-Year Plans followed a different, more detailed pattern, but even within the framework of this new pattern the figures for the individual years are not always comparable. In consequence, the following table does not go beyond 1935; data are based on the official statistical abstract issued in 1934, and completed or revised in accordance with the 1936 edition of the same source.[78]

Wage and Salary Earners in the USSR, 1924-1935

(in thousands)

	1923/24	*1924/25*	*1925/26*	*1926/27*	*1928*	*1929*
Grand Total	...	8,532	10,173	10,944	11,599	12,168
Thereof:						
Large-scale industry	1,795	2,107	2,678	2,839	3,096	3,366
Building	194	287	426	547	723	918
Transportation:						
Total	1,038	1,058	1,240	1,302	1,270	1,302
(a) Railroads	802	806	962	1,006	971	984
(b) Waterways	82	86	99	111	104	111
(c) Other	154	166	179	185	195	207
Communications	81	82	94	95	95	120
Commerce	248	374	471	515	532	627
Public eating places	21	33	45	49	55	79
Education	493	551	603	715	789	819
Public health	252	271	324	365	399	438
Finance	48	66	82	86	95	108
Other government services	887	965	1,082	1,120	1,174	1,255
Agriculture	...	...	...	...	1,676	1,576
Lumber	...	...	...	...	337	415
Domestic service	133	193	253	317	377	396

[78] *Socialist Construction of the USSR. Statistical Year-Book*, Moscow, 1934, pp. 306 ff.; 1936, pp. 508 f.

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	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Grand Total	14,531	18,990	22,945	22,325	23,681	24,770
Thereof:						
Large-scale industry	4,264	5,483	6,481	6,229	6,531	7,066
Building	1,623	2,549	3,126	2,561	2,618	2,204
Transportation:						
Total	1,499	1,927	2,222	2,305	2,556	2,922
(a) Railroads	1,084	1,320	1,527	1,474	1,603	1,789
(b) Waterways	132	177	196	189	222	246
(c) Other	283	430	500	642	730	887
Communications	153	197	224	258	295	334
Commerce	815	1,078	1,411	1,375	1,465	1,650
Public eating places	181	365	515	532	546	485
Education	921	1,153	1,347	1,463	1,569	1,725
Public Health	477	562	647	681	739	809
Finance	101	116	128	132	134	152
Other government services	1,470	1,712	1,918	1,753	1,680	1,745
Agriculture	1,552	2,060	2,858	2,819	3,094	2,974
Lumber	611	857	1,140	1,193	1,209	1,300
Domestic service	253	228	216	...	...	...

More recently, data referring to the last years covered by the table above were partly revised and regrouped so as to offer a basis for comparison with subsequent years. The statistical abstract issued in 1939 [79] compared the number of wage and salary earners in 1932, the last year of the First Five-Year Plan, with that in 1937, the last year of the Second Five-Year Plan. These data, complemented by projected figures for 1942, the last year of the Third Five-Year Plan,[80] follow:

[79] *Socialist Construction in the USSR, 1933-1938*, Moscow, 1939. p. 138.

[80] See the draft of the Third Five-Year Plan, as quoted *supra*, n. 75, pp. 228 f.—When the Third Five-Year Plan was approved, the projected figure for wage and salary earners in 1942 was raised by 700,000 (to 32,700,000). The approved figures for the different branches of economy were not made public.

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Wage and Salary Earners in the USSR at the end of the First and Second Five-Year Plans, and Projected Figures of the Third Five-Year Plan (in thousands)

	1932	*1937*	*1942* (planned)
Grand Total	22,942.8	26,989.5	32,000
Thereof:			
Industry	7,999.8	10,111.7	11,899
thereof:			
manual workers		8,048.0	9,184
technical employees		697.7	910
other white-collar workers		586.5	675
lower service personnel		475.2	630
apprentices		303.4	500
Building	2,835.1	2,023.2	1,829
thereof:			
manual workers		1,672.6	1,497
technical employees		119.9	129
other white-collar workers		122.5	98
lower service personnel		97.5	91
apprentices		10.7	14
Railway transportation	1,296.6	1,512.2	1,700
Water transportation	145.5	179.5	230
Other transportation	598.5	1,092.1	1,735
Communications	224.3	375.0	500
Commerce	1,410.8	1,993.9	2,500
Public eating places	515.1	395.5	560
Finance	128.4	192.8	230
Education	1,351.1	2,303.0	2,900
Arts	84.5	122.0	165
Health service	647.2	1,117.6	1,600
Other government services	1,833.5	1,743.3	2,000
Housing and municipal services		753.7	920
Agriculture	2,857.5	2,482.6	2,650
Lumber	196.1	247.9	325
Others		246.0	195

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Social Group	*Per Cent of Total Population*	
Wage earners	32.19	49.73
Salary earners	17.54	
Peasants on collectivized farms	44.61	46.90
Artisans organized in producers' cooperatives	2.29	
Peasants on independent individual farms	1.78	2.60
Artisans not organized in cooperatives	.82	
Others	.77	
Total	100.00	

464 These figures should be treated with caution. The precentage of workers and employees was put at 34.7 for 1937 in the statistical reference work cited above, which appeared in 1939. It is true that certain shifts took place between 1937 and January, 1939, and the percentage of workers and employees might—in view of the shifts in the immediately preceding years—be estimated at perhaps 37, but under no circumstances at 49.7. Whence this sudden rise of a full third in the percentage total?

464 466 It is apparent that the data for workers and employees in the two tables given above do not refer to the same group of persons. In the compilation of the first table (through 1937), only persons occupying a regular work status were considered to be workers and employees, in accordance with the data in the current statistics for the labor force; in the compilation of the second table (for 1939), however, several million additional persons were counted as workers and employees. It is known from the statements of former Soviet slaves that the slaves (in concentration camps, etc.) were included in the national census of 1939 and that they were registered, not according to their former professions, but according to their work in the camps, i.e., in all cases as workers and employees. This was confirmed recently in a work by a former Soviet statistician, who took part in the census of 1939.[44] The number of workers and employees according to the census of 1939 therefore had to be considerably higher than the number of workers and employees according to the current statistics for the labor force.

If this were the only cause of the great discrepancy between the two figures given (37.0 and 49.7 per cent), the number of slaves in 1939 would have to equal about a third of the number of workers and employees holding a regular work status, that is, it would have to reach a total of some 10,000,000. In reality, however, the number of

[44] N. Galin, *How Censuses Were Carried Out in the USSR.* (Russian), Munich, 1951, p. 20.

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slaves at the beginning of 1939 was probably somewhat smaller, since part of the group "workers and employees (with families)" in the 1939 census should perhaps be attributed to certain tricks on the part of the official statisticians, who were set the task of computing the highest possible percentage figure for the "workers and employees" group. For this reason, a farm family perhaps, whose head had been employed however briefly as a worker in industry, building, etc., was counted in its entirety as a workers' family (note the great difference between the 1937 and 1939 data for collective farmers and, even more, for individual farmers). Some other statistical tricks were perhaps also employed. All this, however, can explain only a relatively limited part of the 10,000,000 discrepancy. These 10,000,000 were undoubtedly, for the most part, slaves.[45]

[45] See my article, "Statistics on Slave Labor," in *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*, December, 1951.

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Chapter Two

TRANSFORMATION OF THE LABOR MARKET

Labor Market and Labor Market Policy Until 1930.—The Turning Point: Tightening of the Labor Supply.—Main Problem after 1930: Industrial Labor Supply.—The End of Unemployment Insurance and of the Labor Market.—Manpower Recruitment on the Farms.—"Activation" of Urban Labor Reserves: Female Labor.—"Activation" of Juvenile Reserves.—Preparations for a Planned Distribution of Manpower.

Labor Market and Labor Market Policy Until 1930

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From the very outset, the Soviet labor market was influenced by the distinctive features of Russian industrial labor and its close ties with the rural economy. Between 1918 and 1921, in the years of economic disintegration, millions fled from the cities to the country. The urban labor market was deserted to the point where even the shrunken urban economy could only be kept functioning by the introduction of compulsory labor.[1] Economic recovery, which began in 1921, and the reemployment of millions started an influx of migrants from the countryside. Unemployment, hitherto latent, became manifest. Russia presented a peculiar phenomenon: the number of unemployed rose right along with the number of employed.

As the rise in employment was dealt with in the preceding chapter, it remains to point out the unemployment trend. According to employment exchange statistics, unemployment increased

[1] Cf. my article "Die Arbeitspflicht in Russland," *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie*, October, 1925.

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• 464 rapidly from early in 1922, as will be seen from the following figures:[1]

		Registered Unemployed (in thousands)
1922	January	175
	July	436
1923	January	625
	July	1,000
1924	January	1,240
	July	1,340

In the second half of 1924 a reorganization of the employment exchanges was initiated. With the reorganization of the service, compulsory hiring through these exchanges was relaxed and the sifting of the waiting lists of job applicants ordered. As an immediate consequence, the number of registered unemployed dropped from July 1924 on, if only for a short time. For 1924/25 and the following years the yearly average figures were as follows:[2]

	Registered Unemployed (in thousands)
1924/25	848
1925/26	1,017
1926/27	1,242
1927/28	1,290

Corresponding yearly averages for 1928/29 and 1929/30 are not known. The following figures reveal a further increase in unemployment until it began to recede in the second half of 1929:[3]

Years	*Registered Unemployed* (in thousands)	
	April 1	*October 1*
1927	1,478	1,041
1928	1,576	1,365
1929	1,741	1,242
1930	1,081	...

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[1] A. Mints, "The Labor Market in 1924," *Voprosy Truda*, March, 1925, p. 24.
[2] *Control Figures for the National Economy of the USSR for 1927/28*, Moscow, 1928, p. 215; *Control Figures . . . for 1928/29*, Moscow, 1929, p. 156.
[3] M. Romanov, "Labor Market Prospects in the USSR," *Voprosy Truda*, July-August, 1930, p. 46.

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A labor shortage, which we shall later take up in detail, began to develop and soon led to basic changes in manpower policy—changes which affected all subsequent trends. Before discussing these trends, however, let us look briefly at the organization of the labor market in the second half of the 1920's.

The reorganization of the government-operated employment exchanges, begun in the second half of 1924, was completed early in 1925. Sec. 7 of the Labor Code, which required that hiring be done only through employment exchanges, was repealed.[5] Employers were now free to hire whomever they wanted, and employees were free to take any job they wished.

Did the government mean to relax its rigid hold on the labor market—so to speak, to leave the balancing supply and demand to the "free play of forces"? Certainly not. It was soon clear that this was neither intended nor did it actually take place.

The formal repeal of compulsory hiring through the employment exchanges did not inaugurate any "liberal" policy. The governmental employment exchanges, as organized prior to 1925, were simply not up to the tasks facing them in the framework of a labor policy based on their hiring monopoly. There was no end to the complaint of their red tape and inefficiency. The abrogation of Sec. 7 of the Labor Code was merely the first step toward a reorganization that had become inevitable.

The sequel to this first step was a unionist labor market policy that revived the idea of compulsory hiring through the employment exchanges and put it into practice in a new form: by incorporating it in union contracts. There could be no question, under Soviet conditions, of a conflict between governmental and union measures in the field of labor market policy. The repeal of Sec. 7 of the Labor Code and the use of collective bargaining to reintroduce compulsory hiring through the employment exchanges were two links in a single chain of events.

The new method of letting the unions enforce compulsory hiring through employment exchanges was first applied in 1925. By 1926 its use was widespread. The Seventh Trade Union Convention, meeting in December 1926, resolved:[6] "In negotiating

[5] Decision of the CEC and CPC of the USSR, January 2, 1925, *Izvestiya*, January 14, 1925.

[6] Ya. Gindin, "The Seventh Trade Union Convention of the USSR and Unemployment," *Vestnik Truda*, February, 1927, p. 2.